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Abstract We present an account of semantics that is not construed as a mapping of
language to the world but rather as a mapping between individual meaning spaces. The
meanings of linguistic entities are established via a “meeting of minds.” The concepts
in the minds of communicating individuals are modeled as convex regions in concep-
tual spaces. We outline a mathematical framework, based on fixpoints in continuous
mappings between conceptual spaces, that can be used to model such a semantics.
If concepts are convex, it will in general be possible for interactors to agree on joint
meaning even if they start out from different representational spaces. Language is
discrete, while mental representations tend to be continuous—posing a seeming para-
dox. We show that the convexity assumption allows us to address this problem. Using
examples, we further show that our approach helps explain the semantic processes
involved in the composition of expressions.
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1 Introduction
Within traditional philosophy of language, semantics is seen as mapping between a
language and the world (or several “possible worlds”). This view has severe problems.
For one thing, it does not involve the users of the language. In particular, it does not tell
us anything about how individual users can grasp the meanings determined by such
a mapping (Harnad 1990; Gärdenfors 1997). Another tradition, cognitive semantics,
brings in the language user by focusing on the relations between linguistic expressions
and the user’s mental representations of the expressions’ meanings, typically in the
form of so-called image schemas; but cognitive semantics has problems explaining
the social nature of semantics.
In this article, we propose a radically different view of semantics based on a “meet-
ing of minds.” According to this view, the meanings of expressions do not reside in the
world or (solely) in the mental schemes of individual users but rather emerge from the
communicative interaction of language users. The fundamental role of human com-
munication is, indeed, to affect the state of mind of others, “bringing about cognitive
changes” (van Benthem 2008). A meeting of minds means that the representations in
the minds of the communicators become sufficiently compatible to satisfy the goals
that prompted the communication.
As an example of how such a meeting of minds can be achieved by communication
but without the aid of language, consider declarative pointing (Bates 1976; Brinck
2004, Gärdenfors and Warglien, to appear). This consists of one individual pointing
to an object or location and, at the same time, checking that the other individual (the
“recipient”) focuses her attention on the same object or location. The recipient, in turn,
must check that the “sender” notices the recipient attending to the right entity. This
“attending to each others’ attention” is known as joint attention (Tomasello 1999) and
is a good, though fallible, mechanism for checking that the minds of the interactors
meet, by focusing on the same entity.1
Achieving joint attention can be seen as reaching a fixpoint in communication.
When my picture of what I point out to you agrees with my understanding of what you
are attending to, my communicative intent is in equilibrium. Conversely, when what
you attend to agrees with your understanding of what I want to point out to you, your
understanding is in equilibrium (Gärdenfors and Warglien, to appear).2 At the other
end of the communicative spectrum, a purely symbolic kind of meeting of minds is
the agreement of a contract. We will return to such agreements in Sect. 3.
When the interactors are communicating about the external world, pointing is suf-
ficient to make minds meet and agree on a referent. When they need to share referents
in their inner mental spaces, they require a more advanced tool. This is where lan-
guage proves its mettle (Brinck and Gärdenfors 2003; Gärdenfors 2003; Gärdenfors
1 Note that pointing, unlike language, is a continuous way of referring to the outer world: the direction of
the finger is continuously variable.
2 Two features of this process should be noted. First, joint attention requires a so-called theory of mind that
includes second-order attention, in that both communicative partners can attend to the attention of the other.
Second, the two partners need not have the same image of each other’s inner state: it is perfectly possible
for you and I to reach joint attention without my picture of your attention being aligned with your attention.
In other words, joint attention never requires transcending one’s own subjective realm.
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and Osvath 2010). In a way, language is a tool for reaching joint attention in our
inner worlds. Goldin-Meadow (2007, p. 741) goes beyond our metaphorical assertion
to write that, in children, “pointing gestures form the platform on which linguistic
communication rests and thus lay the groundwork for later language learning.”
We will assume that our inner worlds can be modelled as spaces with topological
and geometric structure, using conceptual spaces (Gärdenfors 2000) as the main mod-
eling tool. The conceptual spaces that carry the meanings for a particular individual
are determined partly from the individual’s interaction with the world, partly from her
interaction with others, and partly from her interaction with herself (e.g., in the form of
self-reflection). This approach does not entail that different individuals mean the same
thing by the same expression, only that their communication is sufficiently effective.
As a comparison, consider the models of cognitive semantics (see e.g. Lakoff 1987;
Langacker 1986, 1987; Croft and Cruse 2004; Evans 2006) where image schemas
have traditionally been the core carriers of meaning. An image schema is a conceptual
structure belonging to a particular individual. The mathematical structures of image
schemas are seldom spelled out.3 A natural way to do this is with topological and
geometric notions.
Image schemas are, in general, presented as structures common to all speakers of a
language. Given the socio-cognitive type of semantics we model in this paper, we do not
assume that everybody has the same meaning space, only that there exist well-behaved
mappings between the meaning spaces of different individuals—well-behaved in the
sense that the mappings have certain mathematical properties as specified below.
Our approach takes significant inspiration from the communication games studied
by Lewis (1969, 1979), Stalnaker (1979) and others (e.g. Schelling 1960; Clark 1992;
Skyrms 1998; Parikh 2000, 2010; Jäger and van Rooij 2007). To this foundation, we
add assumptions about the topological and geometric structure of the various individ-
uals’ conceptual spaces that allow us to specify more substantially how the semantics
emerges and what properties it has. Linguistic acts can best be understood as moves
in such games. Not only may the players in a communication game have different
payoff functions; they may also have different meaning spaces. As suggested earlier,
we will show that semantic equilibria can exist without needing to assume that the
communicating individuals possess the same mental spaces.
So long as communication is conceived as a process through which the mental state
of one individual affects the mental state of another, then a “meeting of the minds”
will be that condition in which both individuals find themselves in compatible states
of mind, such that no further processing is required. Just as bargainers shake hands
after reaching agreement on the terms of a contract, so speakers reach a point at which
both believe they have understood what they are talking about. Of course, they may
actually mean different things, just as the bargainers might interpret the terms of the
contract differently. It is enough that, in a given moment and context, speakers reach a
point at which they believe there is mutual understanding. The ubiquity of “assent” sig-
nals in conversations (Clark 1992) nicely demonstrates the importance of the mutual
awareness of such meetings of mind in everyday communication.
3 For an early computational model, see Holmqvist (1993).
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Fig. 1 Joint attention as arriving at a fixpoint
A common way to define such a state mathematically is to identify it as a fixpoint.
A fixpoint x* of a function f (x) is that point at which the function maps x* onto
itself ( f (x*) = x*). What kind of thing is a function that reaches a fixpoint where
minds agree? In linguistic communication, the most natural candidate is a function
that maps language expressions onto mental states and vice-versa: a kind of inter-
pretation function and its inverse expression function. In our framework, minds meet
when the function mapping states of mind onto states of mind, via language, finds a
fixpoint.4
For a simple example of convergence to a fixpoint as a meeting of minds, consider
again the example of joint attention achieved via pointing: e.g., by a child pointing
out something to an adult. The relevant mental spaces are, in this case, taken to be
each person’s visual fields, which may only partially overlap. The goal of the child’s
pointing is to make the adult react by looking at the desired point in her visual field.
The fixpoint is reached when the child sees that the adult’s attention is directed at the
correct location, and the adult believes her attention is directed to what is being pointed
at (see Fig. 1). That fixpoint is characterized by four properties: (1) the attended object
is in my line of gaze, (2) the attended object is in your line of gaze, (3) I see that your
line of gaze has the right orientation, and (4) you see that my line of gaze has the right
orientation. Our lines of gaze intersect at the object, and our representations of each
other’s gaze are consistent.
Now consider an example involving explicit linguistic interaction. Definite refer-
ence, even when verbally performed, generally reflects similar properties. Clark (1992)
suggests a collaborative process in which speaker and addressee “work together in
the making of a definite reference” (Clark 1992, p. 107). Creating such a reference
is a coordination problem that rarely reduces to uttering the right word at the right
time. What is required instead is a process of mutual adjustment between speaker and
addressee converging on a mutual acceptance that the addressee has understood the
4 Communication is like a dog on a leash pulling its master towards something the dog has in mind. The dog
will pull and its master will follow until an equilibrium is reached. The place where they stop is, literally, a
fixpoint.
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speaker’s utterance. The process is highly iterative, involving a series of reciprocal
reactions and conversational moves usually concluded by assent signals. Think of the
complex series of further requests and information extensions, as well as corrections,
nods, and interjections, employed in a simple communicative act such as explaining
to a tourist where to find a restaurant she is looking for. Such a process has the clear
nature of arriving at a fixpoint. Note that conversational adjustments towards mutual
agreement typically resort to both the discrete resources of spoken language and the
continuous resources of gesture, intonation, and other bodily signals.
Using fixpoints is, of course, nothing new to semantics. Programming language
semantics often resort to fixpoints to define the meaning of a particular program; its
meaning is where the program will stop. (For a remarkable review, see Fitting 2002.) In
a different vein, Kripke’s (1975) theory of truth is grounded on the notion of a fixpoint,
but his focus of interest is the fixpoints of a semantic evaluation function. Fixpoints
are crucial in other fields, such as the study of semantic memory; content-addressable
memories usually store information as the fixpoint of a memory update process. (The
canonical example is Hopfield neural nets: see Hopfield 1982.)
We will make a different use of fixpoints to define our “meeting of minds” seman-
tics: namely, as the result of an interactive, social process of meaning construction
and evaluation. Our use of fixpoints resembles the attempt made by game theorists to
define equilibrium as a state of mutual compatibility among individual strategies’.5
(See Parikh’s (2000) equilibrium semantics for a related approach.) Some topological
and geometric properties of mental representations afford meetings of minds because
they more naturally generate communicative activity fixpoints. Following Gärdenfors
(2000), we will represent concepts as convex regions of mental spaces (see next sec-
tion).6 In this way, we shift from a conventional emphasis on the way we share (the
same) concepts to an emphasis on the way the shapes of our conceptual structures
make it possible to find a point of convergence. A parallel to the Gricean tradition of
conversation pragmatics comes to mind. Just as conversational maxims ensure that
dialogues follow a mutually acceptable direction, so the way we shape our concepts
deeply affects communication’s effectiveness.
From this foundation, we make a conjecture about implicit selection: just as wheels
are round because they make transportation efficient, conceptual shapes should be
selected because they make communication smooth and memorization efficient. Both
the convexity and the compactness of concepts play central roles. Constraints on
conceptual structure facilitate the creation of coordinated meanings. Communication
works so long as it preserves the structure of concepts. This will naturally lead to a
consideration of the role of continuous mappings in conveying meaning similarity.
In Sect. 3.2 we will elaborate on the important point that similarity preservation can
be performed by a discrete system: to wit, the expressions of language. Here we will
5 Note that our fixpoints are of a topological nature, while those used most often in computation and logic
exploit properties of monotone functions on (partially) ordered structures.
6 A region is convex whenever any point lying between two points in the region will itself belong to that
region.
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focus on noun phrases and indexical expressions; but our approach can be extended
to other linguistic categories, particularly verb phrases.7
A few points of clarification will be helpful before proceeding to a more formal
argument.
2 The topology of conceptual spaces
The structural properties of conceptual representations that make possible the meeting
of minds are, to a large extent, already to be found in cognitive semantics and, in par-
ticular, the theory of conceptual spaces. These include the metric structure imposed by
similarity; the closed (or “bounded”) nature of concepts; the convexity of concepts;
and the assumption that natural language, with all its resources, can effectively trans-
late mental representations with reasonable approximation. In what follows, we will
make these notions, along with the role they play in a “meeting of minds” semantic
framework, more precise.
The first step is to assume, following Gärdenfors (2000), that conceptual spaces are
constructed out of primitive quality dimensions (often grounded in sensory experience)
and that similarity provides the basic metric structure to such spaces. The dimensions
represent various qualities of objects (e.g., color, shape, weight, size, force, position)
in different domains.8
Recall that a metric space is defined by a set of points with a measure of the distance
between the points. A metrizable topological space is any space whose topological
structure can be induced by some suitable metric. Our fundamental assumptions are
that conceptual spaces are metrizable and that their metric structure is imposed by
a similarity relation. This leaves open the possibility of many different metric struc-
tures. While the precise nature of psychologically sound similarity metrics remains
highly controversial (and presumably differs between domains), numerous studies
(e.g., Shepard 1987; Nosofsky 1988a) suggest it to be a continuous function of Euclid-
ean distance within conceptual spaces. We will assume, as a first approximation, that
conceptual spaces can be modelled as Euclidean spaces. However, the general ideas
may be applied to other metric structures (see e.g. Johannesson 2002).
Following Gärdenfors (2000), we will define concepts as regions in a conceptual
space. Two properties of such regions are worth mentioning. First, so long as concepts
are closed and bounded regions in Euclidean conceptual spaces, they acquire a further,
critical topological property: compactness.9 One important intuition regarding com-
pactness is that it provides “enough” points that are near to a set—this proves critical
when fixpoints come to be defined. Compactness makes it possible to approximate the
entire space through a finite number of points, which will also turn out to be critical
to what follows.
7 For some suggestions on how verbs may be analysed, see Gärdenfors (2007) and Gärdenfors and Warglien
(to appear b). Different kinds of pointing are analysed in Gärdenfors and Warglien (to appear a).
8 Note that conceptual spaces are used to represent relations between concepts, a more general usage than
the representing of single image schemas in cognitive semantics.
9 This follows as a corollary of the classic Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem.
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Second, as proposed in Gärdenfors (2000), concepts can be modeled as convex
regions of a conceptual space. Convexity may seem a strong assumption, but it is
a remarkably regular property of many perceptually grounded concepts: e.g., color
(Jäger 2007, 2010), taste vowels (2007, 2010). Although the main argument for con-
vexity in Gärdenfors (2000) is that it facilitates the learnability of concepts, it is
also crucial for assuring the effectiveness of communication. Although we will in
this paper take the concepts of individuals as given, learnability and effectiveness of
communication clearly do interact in complementary ways in the acquiring of con-
cepts.
There are interesting comparisons to make between analyzing concepts as convex
regions and the prototype theory developed by Rosch and her collaborators. (See for
example Rosch 1975, 1978; Mervis and Rosch 1981; Lakoff 1987.) When concepts are
defined as convex regions in a conceptual space, prototype effects are to be expected.
Given a convex region, one can describe positions in that region as being more or less
central. In a Euclidean space, one can also calculate the center of gravity.
Conversely, if prototype theory is adopted, then the representation of concepts as
convex regions is to be expected. Assume that some quality dimensions of a concep-
tual space are given: for example, the dimensions of color space; and that the intention
is to decompose it into a number of categories: in this case, color concepts.10 If one
starts from a set of concept prototypes p1, . . . , pn—say, the focal colors—then these
prototypes should be the central points in the concepts they represent. The informa-
tion about prototypes can then be used to generate convex regions by stipulating that
any point p within the space belongs to the same concept as the closest prototype
pi . This rule will generate a certain decomposition of the space: a so-called Voronoi
tessellation. An illustration of a Voronoi tessellation is given in Fig. 2. The particu-
lar tessellation is two-dimensional, but Voronoi tessellations can be extended to any
arbitrary number of dimensions.
The basic idea is that the most typical meaning of a word or linguistic expres-
sion is the prototype at the centre of the convex region assigned to the word.11 This
proves to be a central principle in connecting the continuity of mental spaces with the
discreteness of language.
A Voronoi tessellation always results in a decomposition of the space into con-
vex regions. (See Okabe et al. 1992.) The Voronoi tessellation provides an intuitive
geometric answer for how a similarity measure together with a set of prototypes can
determine a set of categories.
The Voronoi tessellation has a dual graph, the so-called Delaunay triangulation,
which will turn out to be useful later on (Okabe et al. 1992). A Delaunay triangulation
is obtained by drawing a line segment between the centers (prototypes) of Voronoi
cells that share a side or vertex. Barring special cases, this rule will result in a trian-
gulation of the space; even in the special cases, the result can easily be extended to a
10 Since the borders of neighbouring regions simultaneously belong to each region, we call the result a
decomposition and not a partitioning. The compactness of the regions is preserved.
11 In Gärdenfors (2000), it is argued that the region assigned to a linguistic expression may not be constant,
but is in general dependent on the context of the use of the expression.
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Fig. 2 A Voronoi tessellation of the plane into convex sets
Fig. 3 A Delaunay triangulation (solid lines) superimposed on a Voronoi diagram (dashed lines)
triangulation. An important property of any Delaunay triangulation is that contiguous
prototypes are connected. Such triangulations play a special role in the approximation
of continuous functions, as we will show (Fig. 3).
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Euclidean metrics, compactness, and convexity together set the stage for our
fixpoint argument. Before getting there, one last point must be made, briefly. A basic
tenet of cognitive semantics is that language is able to preserve the spatial structure
of concepts. One way to express this is that language preserves the nearness rela-
tions among points in conceptual spaces. In topology, a nearness-preserving function
is nothing other than a continuous function. In other words, assuming that language
is able to preserve nearness relations in conceptual spaces implies assuming that lan-
guage is able to establish a continuous mapping between the mental spaces of different
individuals—and, as we shall show, a continuous mapping of the product space of an
individual’s mental space onto itself. While this assumption may seem overly strong,
it basically says that natural language must have enough plasticity to map near points
in one conceptual space onto near points in another conceptual space. We will show
below that this assumption can be relaxed somewhat, to allow that such continuous
mappings can be suitably approximated.
3 Fixpoints
3.1 Examples
We have already suggested that meetings of minds can be modelled as fixpoints
in some kind of meaning space. We have offered referring by pointing as a proto-
typical example of finding a communication fixpoint. We next present a few addi-
tional examples to illustrate the idea, before providing a more formal treatment of our
claim.
Garrod and Anderson (1987) defined an experimental conversational setup in which
two agents have to solve the problem of locating each other while moving around in a
computer-game labyrinth. They are able to talk with each other. The task amounts to
generating descriptions of the maze that are compatible enough to generate appropri-
ate, coordinated action. Dialogue analysis revealed that the agents developed different
representations of the task, but that within such diversity, they tended to narrow in on
compatible representations: not necessarily identical, but preserving structural rela-
tionships such as nearness, direction (right or left), and relative position (below or
above). In a similar way, different subway maps can preserve the essential spatial
relationships between the stations in a network. The choice of description language
seemed to be dependent upon the agent’s mental model, with the mapping from repre-
sentations to language tending to preserve the relationships from the model. It is clear
that the choice of terms must preserve the way the elements of the representations are
profiled (e.g., rows and columns rather than paths), along with their associated spatial
properties: “speakers are adopting particular ‘languages’ of description in relation to
the basic …model, and it is possible to give a reasonable account of these languages if
we make a few straightforward assumptions about the form of the underlying model”
(Garrod and Anderson 1987, p. 202).
The structure-preserving mappings must work symmetrically in production and
interpretation: convergence is facilitated by the interlocutors symmetrically playing
the role of hearer and speaker, while keeping the same representations and mappings
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in both roles. Convergence results from local adjustments, based on mutual consis-
tency checking of consecutive utterances. Consistency checks can be based on simple
heuristics (of which completing the other’s sentence may be considered the limit case)
that need not imply any overall consideration of common ground or the intentions of
the other, only assessing whether one can interpret an utterance in relation to one’s
own representation of the current circumstances: if “two steps along” makes no sense
given one’s current position, there is a misalignment. Where consistency checks fail,
repair is often attempted by reformulating the utterance in terms that may lead—often
do lead, after only a few rounds—to mutual agreement.
Experiments on the emergence of human communication systems often reveal a
similar process, whereby mutual understanding emerges as a fixpoint from a joint
coordination effort. Some of these experiments use (graphical) sign systems, with the
advantage that such systems preserve the continuity of conceptual spaces while verbal
systems discretize it—a problem we will analyze later on. For example, Galantucci
(2005) created a “virtual environment” (reminiscent of Garrod and Anderson’s 1987
setup) consisting of rooms in which players were located without being able to see
each other. They had to meet in the same room using a limited number of moves,
communicating only through a system of signs on an electronic pad. Sending a sign
corresponded to attempting to push the mind of the receiver to locate the right region of
the virtual space, while understanding the meaning of the sign received corresponded
to mentally locating the correct region. So long as participants were not correctly
understanding the signals, the communication system remained out of equilibrium,
participants adjusting their reaction to the signs received (and adjusting the signs they
sent) until they found a response in which both correctly located the meaning of the
sign itself—in this case their reaction to the intended region is the region itself, which
is a clear fixpoint.
Other experiments reveal an analogous structure. In another laboratory-based exper-
iment, Selten and Warglien (2007) studied the emergence of a communication system
through a referential coordination game, in which players had to establish a coor-
dinated mapping of simple geometric objects and arbitrary sequences of elementary
signs. In such a game, mutual understanding corresponds to achieving an equilibrium:
in a state of mutual understanding, players’ interpretations of the signs support each
other, establishing a self-confirming joint mapping of signs and referred-to objects.
(Selten and Warglien (2007) go on to explore how such joint mappings can exhibit
compositionality, an issue we will consider in Sect. 4.)
In addition to these experimental studies, Jäger and van Rooij (2007) provide a
theoretical modeling example of how fixpoints (or, in their case, Nash equilibria)
can be used to model a meeting of minds. They further show how the emergence
of meaning as the fixpoint of a continuous function can result in the discretization
of conceptual spaces. Their choice of domain is the color space; the problem they
examine is how a common meaning for color terms can develop through a communi-
cation game. In their example, there are only two players: s (the signaler) and r (the
receiver). Jäger and van Rooij assume that the two players have a common conceptual
color space C. S has a fixed and finite set of n messages that she can convey to the
receiver. The color space C can be interpreted as a state space from which nature
selects points according to some continuous distribution p. S can choose a decompo-
123
Synthese
sition of C into n subsets, assigning each color a unique message. R can choose where
to locate n points, corresponding to the meaning assigned to each of the n messages
by s.
The goal of the communication game is to maximize the average similarity between
the intention of s and the interpretation of r .12 A Nash equilibrium in the game is a pair
(S*, R*), where S* is s’s decomposition (into n subsets) of C and R* is r ’s n-tuple of
points in C , such that both S* and R* are a best response to each other. The central
conclusion of their paper can be restated by saying that if the color space is convex
and compact and if the probability and similarity functions are continuous, then a
Nash equilibrium exists, and it corresponds to a Voronoi tessellation of the color space
(which results, of course, in convex subsets).
Jäger and van Rooij (2007) model illustrates how a discrete system of signs (there
are only n signs in their game) is compatible with a continuous functions, mapping
agents’ mental representations onto themselves. The signs define an array of locations
in the color space; the best-response function of s and r continuously maps configu-
rations of that array as responses to decompositions of C , as well as vice versa. In this
game, “language” must be plastic enough to permit the continuity of the best response
function, and C must have enough topological structure to afford the existence of
fixpoints. Language plasticity is provided by the possibility to continuously deform
the decomposition S* and the location of the points R*. Notice that adding new signs
would involve only local changes in the Voronoi tessellation. In other words, one need
not revise all linguistic meanings each time one learns a new word.
3.2 Existence of fixpoints
The examples we have cited suggest a few important issues relating to the semantic
use of fixpoints. One, of course, is simply the existence of such fixpoints, and what
features of agents’ conceptual spaces may favor them. Another concerns how to rec-
oncile the continuous nature of mental spaces with the inherent discreteness of verbal
language. A third is how motivation, and the stakes of communication, shape semantic
interaction, as well as how fixpoints can be achieved. We will deal in turn with each
one of these.
In our pointing example as well as in Jäger and van Rooij’s (2007) model, it was
assumed that the communicators share more or less the same mental space: in our
example, the visual field; in their model, the color space. However, in general, differ-
ent individuals will have different mental spaces. For simplicity, assume that there are
only two individuals A and B with mental spaces C1 and C2, both of which are convex
and compact. If A communicates with B, A alters B’s state of mind, and B’s reaction
12 The game unfolds as follows: nature chooses some point in the color space, according to some fixed
probability distribution. S knows nature’s choice, but r does not. Then s is allowed to send one of its
messages to r . R in turn picks a point in the color space. S and r maximize utility if they maximize the
similarity between nature’s choice and r ’s interpretation. The only assumption is that the relevant similarity
is a monotonically decreasing function of the distance in the color space between nature’s choice and r ’s
response.
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Fig. 4 a The fixpoint illustrated for a one-dimensional space. b Fixpoints may not exist if the function is
not continuous
will, in turn, change A’s state of mind.13 In more formal terms, communication can
be described with the help of semantic reaction functions from (x1, x2) to (y1, y2) in
the product space C = C1 × C2. In our framework, the semantic reaction function
represents the inherent bi-directional coupling of production and comprehension pro-
cesses: a point common to much recent research on pragmatics and radical semantics
(Dekker and van Rooij 2000; Pickering and Garrod 2004; van Benthem 2008; Parikh
2010).
As a first abstraction, we assume that the reaction functions are continuous: that is,
small changes in the communication will result in small changes in the reaction. We
will show how such continuous functions can be approximated by discrete structures.
Now that all the ingredients are in place, we can simply remind readers of one of
the most fundamental results of analysis: Brouwer’s (1910) theorem, whereby each
continuous mapping of a convex, compact set onto itself has at least one fixpoint. The
continuous map we are concerned with in the present context is the semantic reaction
function mapping the product space C onto itself. Note that C can be the product of
several individual spaces and not just two. Figure 4a illustrates the fixpoint theorem
for a function mapping a one-dimensional space onto itself, while Fig. 4b shows the
necessity of the continuity assumption.
What Brouwer’s theorem tells us is that, no matter the content of individual mental
representations, so long as such representations are well shaped and the communi-
cative device plastic enough to preserve the spatial structure of concepts, there will
always be at least one point representing a meeting of minds.
So far we have not explicitly considered the role of language in how fixpoints are
achieved. Since people are not telepathic, the mapping between individual concep-
tual spaces must somehow be mediated. Language is the primary mediator, although
gestures and other such tools can also be used. Using language, the speaker maps his
13 Note that at this stage, we are not modelling communication as such, only its effects on mental spaces.
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Fig. 5 A semantic reaction function maps points in C1 × C2 to C1 × C2 via L , where fe is the expression
function and fi the interpretation function
mental space onto some linguistic entities from a language L , and the hearer in turn
maps these expressions onto his mental space. Linguistic communication between two
individuals with a product mental space C1 ×C2 is the composition of a function from
C1 to L and another function from L to C2. This composition results in a modification
of C2: that is, a change of the hearer’s mind. Put simply, linguistic communication
results in a change from (x1, x2) to (x1, y2) in the product space.14 In similar fashion,
when the hearer responds, the mapping from C2 via L to C1 results in a move from
(x1, y2) to (y1, y2) in the product space (Fig. 5).
Others’ communicational intentions can sometimes be rationally anticipated, lead-
ing to a kind of instantaneous adjustment of the interlocutors to a fixpoint, as in a
standard communication game. In general though, communication tends to be more
myopic or at least adaptive, leading to a sequence of partial adjustments that appear to
be the rule rather than the exception in dialogue-based communication (Clark 1992;
Pickering and Garrod 2004). As an example of an elementary adaptive process, con-
sider once more the case of pointing, and let C1 and C2 be the visual spaces of two
individuals A and B. For simplicity, assume that C1 = C2. In the simplest case,
the semantic reaction function starts from (x, y), where x is the point to which A is
pointing, and y is the current position of A, which B is attending to in order to see
the pointing direction of A. The reaction function maps the initial (x*,y0) to (x*,y’),
(x*,y”)…(x*,y* = x), meaning that B is following A’s gaze to the point x . The result-
ing fixpoint is the one at which A and B attend to the same object.
Clark’s example of definite reference provides a more complex illustration of the
nature of semantic reaction functions and the achievement of fixpoints. Cases in which
conversation participants can jump directly to a commonly agreed reference point are
relatively rare. Reference is usually achieved through a sequence of steps. The speaker
must choose one out many possible utterances—typically a noun phrase—to initiate
the process. The initial move may be mapped by the addressee into a state of mind
inadequate to selecting the reference, in which case a sequence of adjustments will be
triggered, requiring moves such as expanded descriptions, elaborations on or repairs to
the original phrase, attempts to verify that the addressee has understood the reference,
etc., until signals of mutual agreement are produced.
14 In fact x1 is altered too, since the expectations of the speaker change, particularly if the speaker has a
theory of mind and can predict the listener’s reactions.
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The semantic reaction function need not be the result of an agent’s explicit repre-
sentation of the mental space of her interlocutor. As Pickering and Garrod (2004) have
argued convincingly, many dialogic moves are primed automatically by the conversa-
tional context, favoring the convergence of interlocutors with a remarkable cognitive
efficiency. An example of such automatic reactions is the tendency of listeners to
complete the utterances of the speaker before she has finished producing them. Bal-
zac’s M. Grandet shrewdly exploited this automatism, using simulated babbling in
the midst of commercial conversations to extract involuntary information from his
interlocutors.
Brouwer’s theorem depends on the reaction function being continuous. What is the
meaning of continuity in the communication context? It is important to remember that
the mental spaces of the interlocutors are based on similarity, which provides the spaces
with their metric structure: in mental spaces, “near to” means “similar to”. Continuity
has a well-known nearness-preserving property, which, in our framework, becomes
similarity preserving. In short, language preserves similarity in mental spaces.15
The mapping from C1 to C2 need not go via a discrete language, either verbal or
signed. Other kinds of communication can be used, such as gestures, mimicry, and
other such visual tools. Using these means, people can construct continuous functions
between their mental spaces. The specific shape of such continuous functions will
depend on a variety of pragmatic factors.
After this informal mathematical detour, our central claim should be clear: whenever
it is important to reach a meeting of minds, convex mental representations provide
the background for language to deploy most of its power. We see this as an indirect
explanation of why concepts are generally convex.16 We are not claiming that con-
vex representations are faithful representations of the world—only that, since they
are effective, one should find them quite widespread. In fact, one should expect to
find convex representations even in cases where they are biased: seeing a non-convex
world with convex spectacles might be a peculiar bias arising from selective pressures
towards effective communication.
Brouwer’s theorem proves the existence of fixpoints for any continuous function
mapping a compact and convex space onto itself. Such a function is cognitively
demanding, both in terms of memory and communication requirements. Our claim
that the semantic reaction function is continuous seems at odds with the discreteness
of language.
15 The notion of nearness, introduced by F. Riesz, provides a geometrically more intuitive foundation for
continuity than the classical ε − δ definition (see Cameron et al. 1974). The definition is simple for metric
spaces, and can be generalized to arbitrary topological spaces. A point xX is near a subset A ⊆ X if every
neighbourhood of x contains a point in A. It can be shown that continuous maps preserve the nearness
relation: i.e., if x is near A, f (x) is near f (A). This avoids the usual counterintuitive difficulties associated
with the traditional contravariant definition of continuity.
16 We view this argument as an inference to the best explanation. We do not view convexity as a necessary
condition for reaching a fixpoint. We are aware that, for many phenomena, one may use weaker assumptions
than employed in this paper: e.g., generalized convexity, purely ordinal topologies, multi-valued functions.
We only want to stress the strong association between the convexity of concepts and the existence of
fixpoints. We thank a reviewer for pointing out this ambiguity.
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Indeed, the continuity of the semantic reaction function may seem too demand-
ing an assumption, in light of the inherent discreteness of the lexicon. The chal-
lenge of reconciling lexical discreteness and, more generally, the discrete symbolic
nature of language with the continuous, spatial nature of conceptual systems has been
fundamental in recent attempts to re-unify lexical semantics (e.g. Jackendoff 2002).
To understand that there is no real conflict, consider a fundamental result of alge-
braic topology: the simplicial approximation theorem, showing that any continuous
function between two Euclidean spaces can be approximated by a mapping between
the vertices of some appropriate triangulation of the spaces (see Appendix 1). As
we have already shown, Voronoi tessellations provide a simple model for how cat-
egorization subdivides a conceptual space into convex sets. We have also described
how the Voronoi diagram has a dual graph, which is a set of triangles generated by
joining contiguous prototypes: that is, the Delaunay triangulation. This suggests that
prototypes generate a basic triangulation of conceptual spaces, in which they play the
role of simplicial vertices. A natural interpretation is that prototypes can provide the
corners of the simplicial approximation of a continuous map between mental spaces.
The correspondence between prototypes and words (or other lexical elements) then
explains how language can serve as a mediator between conceptual spaces, approxi-
mating a continuous function. The result is a great economy in the cognitive resources
needed to memorize and process such a function. For language users, the approx-
imation boils down to remembering and communicating about the prototypes of a
Voronoi decomposition of the space. In this way, the approximation can serve as
a bridge between the discreteness of language and the continuity of the semantic
reaction function. The bottom line is that the mechanisms of language and linguistic
categorization are sufficient to approximate continuity with economic discretization.
The convexity of spaces plays two important roles here: it ensures triangulability,
and it allows reconstructing the behavior of the approximated function as convex
combinations of the values of the approximated function in the correspondences of
vertices.
It may be necessary to change the grain of the triangulation of the spaces in order
to grant a simplicial approximation. Interestingly, human categorization systems have
different levels of granularity, corresponding to different prototypes (Rosch 1975,
1978). As noted in Appendix 1, such an approximation between two triangulated
spaces may only be achievable by further triangulating such spaces. Moving between
levels of categorization may ensure that finer triangulations can be constructed and a
simplicial approximation achieved. Note that, just as categories can be refined locally,
not all simplexes of a simplicial complex need to be further triangulated to achieve
the required degree of decomposition. Given a complex K , one can leave unchanged
a subcomplex P while further triangulating another subcomplex—generating what is
called a subdivision relative to P .
3.3 Shaping the semantic reaction function
Communication is always for some reason. We have postponed until now the issue of
how motivation, and the stakes of communication, shape the semantic reaction func-
123
Synthese
tion. Given what we have presented, it might seem that the semantics we propose is
purely mentalistic. Reality enters via the payoffs of communication. If meaning is not
properly aligned with reality, then communication may incur costs. Reality is why not
all of our wishes come true—or, as Philip K. Dick expresses it: “reality is that which,
when you stop believing in it, doesn’t go away.”
Reality enters communication when we use indexicals. A paradigmatic case is
pointing in combination with saying “this” or that.” As we discussed in the introduc-
tion, pointing is a way of coordinating our visual spaces, via reference to an external
world.
Schelling’s (1960) coordination game has often been used to introduce simple forms
of semantic equilibria (see also Lewis 1969). In such games, all equilibria have the
same payoff; a selection must be made by resorting to external factors, such as con-
ventions or perceptual salience. Of course, reality may enter such games by making
the payoffs of some equilibria superior. To make a Schelling-style example: imagine
that you have agreed to a meeting in a very large square. There are infinitely many
equilibria corresponding to the different locations in the square. However, it happens
to be raining, and only one spot in the square is protected from rain. The obvious
equilibrium to be selected is the one with the payoff of being protected from the rain.
In this way, reality payoffs can be used to select equilibria in communication games.
A related example once more involves definite reference. While doing some electric
repair work, Mary asks Robert to bring her the screwdriver. There are two identical
screwdrivers in the room: one close to Mary and Robert, the other much more distant.
Obvious reasons of payoff dominance suggest the closest hammer as the referent.17
In other cases, reality may disrupt meetings of mind. Small children sometimes con-
fuse height attributes with age. A mother’s description of an adult A as older than an
adolescent B may generate, in the mind of her child, the conviction that A is taller than
B. The child’s signs of assent may convince the mother of mutual understanding—but
as the tall adolescent B shows up, mutual understanding may collapse.
In Jäger and van Rooij (2007) example, explicit payoffs were introduced for the
success of the communication; the payoffs generated the best response function that
determined the fixpoint. Considering the pragmatic factors that determine communi-
cation payoff leads naturally into communication games where speech acts become
moves that modify the conversational playground.
Another advantage of our approach is that it allows one to consider a wide variety
of types of communicative interaction, corresponding to different game types. For
example, one might want to distinguish between coordination and negotiation games.
In coordination games, such as the Jäger and van Rooij color game, the participants
share common interests. In negotiation games, the participants have an interest in
reaching agreement, but they have diverging interests on which agreement to reach.
Consider a semantic negotiation game, in which the interlocutors have an inter-
est in agreeing on a meaning, but each of them wants agreement on different things.
This resembles a contractual negotiation. The agents may have a partial overlap in
representing a certain requisite concept, but in order to reach agreement they need to
17 Parikh (2010) shows more complex examples of how payoff dominance may select meaning.
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negotiate a sufficiently common meaning.18 The process is obviously fallible. One can
find many examples of contractual breaches that originate from different meanings
associated with agreed contractual terms. In a famous court case, the contractors could
not agree on the meaning of the “chicken” that was to be delivered (Frigaliment Imp.
vs. B.N.S. Int’l Sales, 190 F. Supp 116—S.D.N.Y. 1960).
If the mental spaces of the interlocutors diverge widely, more radical communica-
tion methods must be applied in order to achieve a meeting of minds. This is where
metaphors become powerful tools. By using a metaphor that exploits a shared domain,
the speaker can convey information about another domain that has no or only vague
correspondence in the mental spaces of the listeners. (We provide a treatment of met-
aphor in Sect. 4.3.) For example, if one wants to express an emotional experience that
goes beyond the experiences of one’s listeners, a metaphorical description is often the
only available resource.
Some final notes on the fixpoint argument: We have noted the relationship between
our approach and the literature on communication games. There are, however, poten-
tially important differences. While fixpoints are central to defining game equilibria,
fixpoints and game equilibria are not necessarily coincident. Some fixpoints may not
correspond to game equilibria—at least to equilibria as standardly referred to in the
communication games literature. The semantic reaction function is not necessarily
a best response function: as Pickering and Garrod (2004) show convincingly, many
conversational reactions are, to large extent, automatic: primed without any evalua-
tion of alternatives. Indeed many adaptive processes may be conducive to fixpoints
that are not best-response equilibria. While we will often make use of examples from
communication games, it should be understood that fixpoint semantics, as we use it,
is a broader notion than fixpoints in game semantics.
We should avoid implying that fixpoints necessarily mean successful communica-
tion, at least if “successful” corresponds to “optimal”. Indeed, communication can be
effective (i.e., generate a meeting of minds) without generating optimal payoffs in the
activities it is intended to support.
Finally, a meeting of minds need not mean an identity of representations between
agents. It might even be impossible to conceive a perfect alignment of representations
among conversation participants (Parikh 2010)—even though some alignment is part
of the convergence process in most conversations. (See again Pickering and Garrod
2004.) A strength of our approach is that it can encompass communicative agreement
between participants even when their conceptual spaces differ. Homeomorphic spa-
tial properties—rather than content of conceptual spaces—may, in many cases, be
enough to sustain communication. What makes communication possible is the capac-
ity to establish similarity-preserving mappings between the conceptual spaces of the
participants.
18 The convexity of their conceptual spaces may also help in reaching a solution.
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4 Compositionality
Up to this point, we have treated the emergence of meaning as the holistic process
of finding a fixpoint with a single utterance. All real communication is an articu-
lated process that involves the composition of simple meaning components into larger
wholes. Students of language have addressed this issue by different strategies. The
Fregean tradition has emphasized the combinatorial nature of meaning composition,
whereby the meaning of a composite expression is fully determined by the meaning of
its components and the rules for composing its structure. Students of metaphor have
introduced non-Fregean meaning composition as mappings across semantic domains
(Holyoak and Thagard 1996; Fauconnier and Turner 1998; Gärdenfors 2000). Finally,
conversation analysis has emphasized a sequential composition of meaning through
the accumulation of a common ground (Clark and Schaefer 1989). In this section, we
suggest ways to reconcile and unify these traditions.
4.1 Direct composition
Compositionality is a fundamental semantic property. Compositionality emerges
directly from our framework of space and functions. To give a trivial example: the
meaning of “blue rectangle” is defined as the Cartesian product of the “blue” region
of color space and the “rectangle” region of shape space (which we leave undefined
here19). Note that the product of any compact and convex sets will again be a compact
and convex set: the structural properties of conceptual spaces are preserved under this
basic composition operator.
Not only are topological properties preserved but also the continuity of functions. If
functions f : A → X and g : B → Y are both continuous, then the product function
h = ( f, g) : A × B → X × Y is also continuous. The composition of continuous
functions (g ◦ f ) is likewise continuous. This allows one to concatenate functions
while preserving their basic properties.20 Taken all together, the consequence is that
compositionality can preserve, at a higher level of aggregation, the fixpoint properties
of simpler meaning components. Compositionality can also help fine tune the grain of
the fixpoint approximation by allowing finer decompositions of a conceptual space. A
policeman helping a tourist find a certain building can progressively refine his descrip-
tion of the surrounding buildings by compositionally adding attributes—the yellow
building with a large iron gate on the right of the post office—making smaller and
smaller the set of buildings under consideration. In this way, compositionality enriches
the set of communication moves available to achieving a meeting of minds.
The blue rectangle conceptual region can be decomposed into its generating regions
“blue” and “rectangle” via projection (in turn is a continuous function) from the prod-
uct space to its component spaces. Once again, the compactness and convexity of the
blue rectangle region are preserved under projection (Fig. 6).
19 For an analysis, see Gärdenfors (2000, Sect. 3.10.1).
20 In a totally different spirit, Lewis (1970) uses the compositionality of functions to analyse various
linguistic categories.
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Fig. 6 Projection on the color
dimension
One can recursively create ever richer composite concepts that preserve the basic
topological properties of the original conceptual spaces: there seems to be no upper
bound. There is a lower bound to decomposition via projection. Either the projection
is one-dimensional, so that no further projection makes sense, or it is an integral set of
dimensions, which we will call a domain.21 For example, an object cannot be given
a hue without simultaneously giving it a brightness. A domain is not decomposable
because it cannot be reconstructed as the product of lower dimensional projections.
The proposed analysis of meaning compositionality is not the same as the classical
Fregean one. Compositionality is traditionally generated from the meaning of words or
expressions, while on our account it is generated from domains and functions. Since
each domain is associated with a class of words—e.g., the class of color words—
composing domains generates a composite conceptual space, and the meanings of
composite expressions can be located as regions of the composite space.
Our implicit assumption is that the domains of the product constructions are inde-
pendent. The reality of linguistic usage shows that that the spaces associated with
composite expression are not fully independent; some pre-processing must take place
before they can be properly composed. As an example of pre-processing, we will
consider some cases of modifier-head composition.
4.2 Modifier—head composition
In the simplest cases—such as “blue rectangle”, where “blue” is the modifier and
“rectangle” is the head—the two associated domains (color and shape) can safely
be assumed to be independent. However, this is rare in actual language use. More
commonly, our knowledge of the space associated with the head may affect our repre-
sentation of the modifier. White wine is not white; a large squirrel is not a large animal;
and a thick forest does not compare to thick hair. In all these cases, some preprocessing
21 The notion of integral dimensions and their connection to domains is presented in Gärdenfors (2000,
Sect. 1.8).
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Fig. 7 The subspace of skin colors embedded in the full color spindle (from Gärdenfors 2000, p. 121)
of the representation of the modifier space seems to be required to adapt it to one’s
knowledge of the head space.22
Some properties cannot be defined independently of other properties at all. Con-
sider “tall”, which is connected to the height dimension but cannot be identified with
a specific region in this dimension. To see the difficulty, consider that a chihuahua is
a dog, but a tall chihuahua is not a tall dog. “Tall” presumes some contrast class given
by some other property: things are not tall in themselves but only in relation to some
other class of things. For a given contrast class Y —say the class of dogs—the region
H(Y ) of possible heights of objects in Y can be determined. A particular Y can be said
to be a tall Y if it belongs to the upper part of the region H(Y ).
For a contrast class such as skin color, one can map out the possible colors on the
color spindle. This mapping will determine a subset of the full color space. If the
subset is given the same geometry as the full color space, one obtains something like
Fig. 7. In the smaller spindle, the color words are used in the same way as in the full
space, even if the hues of the color in the smaller space don’t match the hues of that
color in the complete space. Thus, “white” is used to describe the lightest shades of
skin, even though “white” skin is actually pinkish; “black” refers to the darkest shades
of skin, even though most “black” skin is brown; and so on.
Provided that the head and modifier spaces are compact and convex regions of met-
ric spaces, a way always exists of re-scaling the distances in the modifier space to fit
22 Note that it is not the head but the modifier that is modified before the composition of meanings takes
place.
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Fig. 8 A radial projection
the constraints of the head space in a one-to-one correspondence. In this way, all color
words are available to characterize skin color. Radial projection (Berge 1997) provides
a natural conceptual tool to model such contextual re-scaling effects.23 Consider two
convex sets C and D defined within a space X and sharing an interior point 0 (taken
arbitrarily as the origo). A radial projection is a mapping that establishes a one-to-one
correspondence between the points in C and those in D, as well as between the frontier
points of C and those of D. Such a correspondence re-defines the distance between the
points in C and the origo in terms of the distance between the corresponding points
in D. Figure 8 shows an example of correspondence between points on the boundaries
(x0 and y0), and points in the interior (x and y).
It can be shown that a radial projection establishes a homeomorphism between two
convex sets. So long as two sets are convex and compact and have a common interior
point, such homeomorphism always exists (Berge 1997, p. 167).
This allows us to formulate a general principle: if the region of space representing
the head contains a point shared with the space representing the modifier, this point can
be taken as the origo of a transformation of the modifier space. The radial projection
function tells one how to import structure from other domains. So long as concepts are
convex and compact, such a function always exists. Radial projection is a continuous
function—so, again, all transformations preserve nearness!
If the head and modifier share only some dimensions, the modifier (“pet” in “pet
fish”) or the head (“stone” in “stone lion”) is projected onto the shared subspace and
then expanded into a shared space by inverse projection. With “stone lion”, the rep-
resentation of stone includes the property “non-living,” while “living” is presumed
by many of the domains of “lion”. These domains—e.g., sound, habitat, behavior—
cannot be assigned any region at all. By and large, the only domain of “lion” that is
compatible with stone is the shape domain. Consequently, the meaning of “stone lion”
is an object made of stone in the shape of a lion.
23 See Appendix 2 for a more rigorous definition of radial projection.
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Fig. 9 a The literal meaning of “peak” b Metaphorical re-interpretation of (from Gärdenfors 2000, p. 177)
Gärdenfors (2000, p. 122) formulates the following rule for the meaning of the
composition of a head D with modifier C : “The combination CD of two concepts
C and D is determined by letting the regions for the domains of C , confined to the
contrast class defined by D, replace the corresponding regions for D.” One can see
how this principle follows as a consequence of the account presented in this section.
The head of a composed expression introduces a context that influences the meaning
of the modifier. We will discuss more general context effects in Sect. 4.4.
4.3 Metaphorical composition
Even if the head and the modifier do not share any dimensions, one can still create a
mapping between the domains by exploiting their convexity and compactness. Indeed,
an important consequence of radial projection is that any two convex, compact spaces
can be mapped via homeomorphism. This permits the creation of metaphors as the
transfer of structure from one domain to another. Once the transfer is made, one is
back to the previous modifier action.
Consider the expression “the peak of a career”. The literal meaning of “peak” refers
to a structure in physical space: namely, the vertically highest point in a (large) hori-
zontally extended object, typically a mountain. This presumes two spatial dimensions,
horizontal and vertical (see Fig. 9a).
A career is an abstract entity with no spatial location. How can a career have a peak?
What happens is that the same geometrical structure from the mountain is applied to
a two-dimensional space: the horizontal spatial dimension is mapped onto the time
dimension (what point the person is in her career), and the vertical spatial dimension
is mapped onto a dimension of social status (see Fig. 9b). The latter dimension is
typically conceived of as vertical: one talks about somebody having a “higher” rank,
“climbing” in the hierarchy, etc. (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980).
A metaphor does not come alone: it not only compares two concepts but also the
structure of two complete domains. Once two domains have been connected via met-
aphor, this connection may serve as a generator for new metaphors based on the same
kind of relations (see also Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Tourangeau and Sternberg 1982;
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Gärdenfors 2000, Sect. 5.4). In brief, metaphorical mappings involve whole systems
of concepts.
We have presented three ways of composing a modifier and a head. The first is
plain compositional product construction. The second presupposes an adaptation of
the modifier space, as a radial projection (via a gauge function) onto the head space. The
third, involved in metaphor, requires an additional homeomorphic mapping between
spaces. All three cases presume that mental spaces are partitioned into domains. The
topological properties of the spaces are preserved, preparing them for further compo-
sition—creating finer approximations of a continuous semantic reaction function.
The composition discussed in Sect. 4.1 is really a special case of the composition in
Sect. 4.2, which in turn is a special case of the composition in Sect. 4.3. The first sort
need not modify existing spaces. The second sort modifies spaces that are naturally
overlapping. Finally, the metaphors in Sect. 4.3 require establishing homeomorphic
correspondences between the different (non-overlapping) spaces. In consequence, we
expect that each of the three levels of composition will in turn require increasing
cognitive processing.
4.4 Context and common ground
The composition of meaning usually takes place in multiple steps in larger communi-
cation structures such as conversations. A full account of the composition of meaning
should therefore consider the sequential process through which meaning is determined.
Conversation analysis has singled out two main processes of temporal compo-
sition. One is the aforementioned accumulation of common ground, including the
conversational use of context (Lewis 1979; Stalnaker 1979; Clark 1992). The other
is the interactive alignment of representations (Pickering and Garrod 2004). These
two processes can be clearly distinguished in our framework: the first is a progressive
restriction within a given representation, creating finer partitions; the other modifies
the salience of the conceptual dimensions carried by the topic of the conversation.
A typical move in a communication game that proposes to enlarge the common
ground is an assertion (Clark 1992; Warglien 2001). Stalnaker (1979, p. 323) writes:
“…the essential effect of an assertion is to change the presuppositions of the par-
ticipants in the conversation by adding the content of what is asserted to what is
presupposed. This effect is avoided only if the assertion is rejected.” If the listener’s
countermove is accepting the assertion, then both parties contract their mental spaces
(and expand their belief states). If, on the other hand, the listener rejects the assertion,
another move will need to be attempted (for examples, see Clark 1992).
Sentences can affect the common ground through a reduction of the possibilities
left open (Stalnaker 1979; Heim 1983; Clark 1992). Stalnaker assumes that the goal
of a conversation is to converge towards a smaller set of possible worlds. We do not
need the assumption of a strong shared representation on our approach. So long as
the mental spaces of the participants satisfy the necessary topological properties, then
the structure of the spaces, together with contraction, guarantees convergence. More
precisely, if the product space of the mental space C is compact, and the reaction
function f : C → C is continuous, then:
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If, for any n, f(C) ⊇ f2(C) ⊇ · · · ⊇ fn(C) (repeated applications of f to its range
generate a decreasing sequence); and, for each x, f(x) = Ø, then there exists a compact
subset K of the product space such that f(K ) = K .24
If the communication game constantly contracts the mental spaces of the partici-
pants, convergence is (given compactness) intuitively unavoidable. The typical rules
of conversation, as set down by Grice (1975), are communicational institutions that
help maintain the contractive nature of communication and thus ensure convergence.
In brief, compactness, together with Grice’s maxims, results in convergence towards
the common ground. The condition “repeated applications of f to its range generate a
decreasing sequence” corresponds to the maxim of quantity (always be informative),
and the condition “f(x) = Ø” corresponds to the maxim of quality (never speak
falsely).
Alignment (Pickering and Garrod 2004) is a different process, relying on the ten-
dency, given the multi-dimensional representation of a situation, for conversants to
align, mostly by automatically primed processes, either whole representations or spe-
cific dimensions of representations that were previously introduced in the conversation.
In more complex cases, domains may prime structurally related ones: i.e., a temporal
reference frame can be primed by a spatial reference frame (Boroditsky 2000). In our
framework based on dimensions and domains in conceptual spaces, the process of
alignment can be seen naturally both as a process of selecting common domains and
as one of determining the relative weight of specific dimensions. Our framework fur-
ther allows modeling how alignment contributes to mutual agreement. A simple visual
example will illustrate this last point. Two agents with different sets of prototypes (dots
and stars in Fig. 10a) may generate different decompositions of a two-dimensional
space (solid and dotted lines), such that their categorization of entities in that space
will disagree most of the time. Nevertheless, as conversation proceeds, they may alter
their representations: e.g., by priming a greater salience for the X axis. Changes in
salience will result in changes of axis weights, altering the distance between points
(Gärdenfors 2000). By adjusting the weight of the two dimensions, the agents will be
able to align their categorization of points in the space such that they will come to
agree most of the time (Fig. 10b).
A strong claim, taken from pragmatics, is that meaning is largely underdetermined
until context is brought in. Our account suggests that context can affect the deter-
mination of meaning in two ways. One is by being added to the common ground as
described above. The second is through the modification of representations. We have
already discussed three ways in which such modification may happen: (1) the contrast
effect whereby vague terms like “tall” become more determinate; (2) the metaphorical
mappings that allow introducing additional content, especially when the speaker has
reason to believe that the addressee lacks compatible representations; (3) the priming
effects that make some dimensions more salient.
24 The proof immediately follows from Theorem 8 in Berge (1997, p. 113).
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Fig. 10 Agreement by salience manipulation
5 Conclusion
This article presents a novel semantic theory, based on the meeting of minds. It puts
more structure into communication games by exploiting the topological and geometric
properties of individual mental spaces, modeled here in terms of conceptual spaces.
Our approach emphasizes the shape of representations rather than their contents. One
advantage, in contrast to cognitive semantics, is that we need not assume that the inter-
locutors share identical mental spaces. This makes it possible to explain how people
can misunderstand each other but still avoid losing contact altogether.
Putnam (1975) has criticized cognitive approaches to semantics, concluding that
“meanings ain’t in the head” and that external reality must be a component in any rea-
sonable semantic theory. Contra Putnam’s argument, our socio-cognitive framework
shows that meanings are in the heads of language users, when their minds meet.25 Since
our minds can meet over total fantasies, reality is not required for meaning to arise or
for communication to succeed. Reality enters the picture when there are stakes to the
communication, such that success depends on the outcome of some communication
game.
An advantage of our approach is that we are able to establish a connection between
the discreteness of language resources and the continuity of thought. We have argued
that language, in a broad sense including context and other pragmatic aspects, contains
mechanisms to preserve the similarity of meanings. We show that language, with all
its resources, is an efficient way of approximating the continuity of semantic map-
pings. We have focused on compositionality, but many other aspects of how linguistic
structures preserve similarity should be investigated. We have shown how semantics
can exist and a meeting of minds arise without language, in the pointing example. This
is a great advantage to our approach: it unifies the different forms of communication
and does not treat language as an exclusive carrier of meaning.
25 See also Gärdenfors (2000, Sect. 5.7.)
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Fig. 11 a Mapping triangulation. b A piecewise linear approximation of a one-dimensional function
It should be emphasized that our presentation here is just a framework and not a
model. That said, our framework lends itself naturally to modeling. We have only
considered linguistic structures in very general terms: some forms of composition
applied mostly to noun phrases. The next step would be to connect different linguistic
categories to particular mathematical operations.
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Appendix 1: Simplicial approximation of a continuous function
This appendix briefly explains the concept of the simplicial approximation of a con-
tinuous function, which we used to relate fixpoints with the discreteness of language
in Sect. 3. The basic idea can be stated quite simply, but it requires some preliminary
definitions.26 Let X be a convex compact set in a Euclidean space C . A triangulation
K of X is a decomposition of that set in a finite set of simplexes, where a simplex
is the set of convex combinations of n independent points in some m-dimensional
Euclidean space. (Basically, it is an m-dimensional generalization of a triangle.) The
triangulation further requires that two of the simplexes meet in (at maximum) one face
or edge. The combinatorial structure thus generated constitutes a geometric simplicial
complex. Although a geometric simplicial complex is not of itself a topological space,
its points, topologized as a subspace of C , are a topological space: the polyhedron |K |.
A simplicial map f : |K | → |L| between two polyhedra |K | and |L| is a function that
maps the vertices of |K | to the vertices of |L|, while preserving the simplexes. In other
words, if a0, a1 . . . an are the vertices a simplex in K , then f (a0), f (a1) . . . f (an) are
the vertices of a simplex in L .27 Figure 11a provides a simple illustration. Note that
26 In what follows, we heavily rely on the presentation in Maunder (1980).
27 Notice that f (a0), f (a1), . . . f (an) need not all be different points: repetition is allowed.
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it is required, if x is a convex combination of a0, a1 . . . an , for f (x) to be a convex
combination of f (a0), f (a1), . . . f (an). It can be shown that f must be continuous.
A simplicial map is, as noted, a simplex preserving map. Simplicial maps have
another very important property. Given two convex, compact sets X and Y and a con-
tinuous function g:X → Y , there will always exist a simplicial map f approximating g,
provided that X and Y can be triangulated at a sufficiently fine grain. By “f approx-
imating g”, it is meant that f is homotopic to g: put simply, that g can be obtained
from a continuous deformation of f , a result known as the simplicial approximation
theorem. The theorem proves that any continuous map can be approximated by a
piecewise linear map. Figure 11b provides a simple example in which both X and Y
are one-dimensional sets. The simplicial map f preserves the fixpoint properties of g
and can be used to approximate the fixpoints of g.
An important proviso concerning is that, as mentioned above, it will not always be
possible to make a simplicial approximation between two given triangulated spaces:
specifically, where it is not possible to triangulate such spaces with a sufficiently fine
grain. In other words, the triangulation of |K | may be insufficiently fine grained to per-
mit a simplicial approximation. That said, if |K| can be further subdivided, a simplicial
approximation will always exist. The compactness of |K | ensures such further triang-
ulability. Only the subdivision of one part of a simplicial complex may be needed.
Given a complex K , one can leave unchanged everything but a sub-complex P and
further triangulate the sub-complex, generating a subdivision relative to P .28
Appendix 2: Radial projection
A gauge (also known as a Minkowski functional) of a convex set, with interior point 0
taken as the origo, is a generalized numeric function j defined as:
j(x) = inf{t : t > 0, x ∈ tC} if x ∈ tC for at least one t > 0 (where tC is C inflated
by factor t);
j(x) = ∞ otherwise.
It is easily shown (Berge 1997) that if x ∈ C , then j(x) ≤ 1. (in particular, j(x) =
1ifx is on the boundary of the set.)
Consider convex sets C and D, both defined within a space X and possessing a
common interior point 0 (taken arbitrarily as the origo). Let j and k be the gauge
functions for C and D respectively. One can define the following function σ : X → X :
y = σ (X) =
( j (X)
k (X)
)
X
Such function (called a radial projection) establishes a correspondence between each
point of C and a corresponding point in D:
k (y) = k
[ j (X)
k (X)
]
X = j (X)
k (X)
k (X) = j (X)
28 See Maunder (1980, Sect. 2.5.7).
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